This Bison Books edition includes a new chapter that provides a framework for evaluating air power effectiveness in future conflicts.
Author: Mark Clodfelter
Publisher: U of Nebraska Press
Tracing the use of air power in World War II and the Korean War, Mark Clodfelter explains how U. S. Air Force doctrine evolved through the American experience in these conventional wars only to be thwarted in the context of a limited guerrilla struggle in Vietnam. Although a faith in bombing's sheer destructive power led air commanders to believe that extensive air assaults could win the war at any time, the Vietnam experience instead showed how even intense aerial attacks may not achieve military or political objectives in a limited war. Based on findings from previously classified documents in presidential libraries and air force archives as well as on interviews with civilian and military decision makers, The Limits of Air Power argues that reliance on air campaigns as a primary instrument of warfare could not have produced lasting victory in Vietnam. This Bison Books edition includes a new chapter that provides a framework for evaluating air power effectiveness in future conflicts.
Author: Anthony M. SchinellaPublish On: 2019-02-19
This book by a long-time U.S. intelligence analyst assesses the military operations and post-conflict outcomes in five cases since the mid-1990s in which the United States and/or its allies used airpower to “solve” military problems: ...
Author: Anthony M. Schinella
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
Category: Political Science
Airpower can achieve military objectives—sometimes, in some circumstances It sounds simple: using airpower to intervene militarily in conflicts, thus minimizing the deaths of soldiers and civilians while achieving both tactical and strategic objectives. In reality, airpower alone sometimes does win battles, but the costs can be high and the long-term consequences may fall short of what decision-makers had in mind. This book by a long-time U.S. intelligence analyst assesses the military operations and post-conflict outcomes in five cases since the mid-1990s in which the United States and/or its allies used airpower to “solve” military problems: Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Lebanon in 2006, and Libya in 2011. In each of these cases, airpower helped achieve the immediate objective, but the long-term outcomes often diverged significantly from the original intent of policymakers. The author concludes that airpower sometimes can be effective when used to support indigenous ground forces, but decision-makers should carefully consider all the circumstances before sending planes, drones, or missiles aloft.
Nevertheless , the very existence of such uncertainties about the future simply
reiterates the limits of military force in general . ... Two of them , as we have seen ,
dealt explicitly with limitations of air power - even though both turned out to be as
Between the world wars the main task of the RAF was to crush tribal rebellions against British rule.
Author: David E. Omissi
Publisher: Manchester University Press
Category: Political Science
Between the world wars the main task of the RAF was to crush tribal rebellions against British rule. This study, based almost entirely on unpublished documents, shows how the independent peacetime role of air policing ensured the survival of the RAF during the lean financial times after WWI. Its analysis of rebellion and imperial violence is of interest to a broad audience. Distributed by St. Martin's Press. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Dr. Donald J. Mrozeks research sheds considerable light on how the use of air power evolved in the Vietnam War.
Author: Donald J. Mrozek
Publisher: The Minerva Group, Inc.
Dr. Donald J. Mrozeks research sheds considerable light on how the use of air power evolved in the Vietnam War. Much more than simply retelling events, Mrozek analyzes how history, politics, technology, and the complexity of the war drove the application of air power in a long and divisive struggle. Mrozek delves into a wealth of original documentation, and his scholarship is impeccable. His analysis is thorough and balanced. His conclusions are well reasoned but will trouble those who have never seriously considered how the application of air power is influenced by factors far beyond the battlefield. Wether or not the reader agrees with Mrozek, the quality of his research and analysis makes his conclusions impossible to ignore. John C. Fryer, Jr. Brigadier General, United States Air Force Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education
His current and comprehensive study considers how we got to this point, and what the future has in store. Anyone seeking a balanced, accurate understanding of air power in history will find this book an essential introduction.
Author: Jeremy Black
This ground-breaking study offers a compelling and original interpretation of the rise of military aviation. Jeremy Black, one of the world s finest scholars of military history, provides a lucid analysis of the use of airpower over land and sea both during the two world wars and the more limited wars of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Considering both the theory and praxis of air power, the authorbegins with hot air balloons, and then highlights the use of zeppelins, piston engine fighters, jet bombers, and finally the so-called Military Revolution of today. While discussing the growth of American and European military aviation, Black, a pioneer in emphasizing the importance of non-Western military history for understanding global developments, also traces the emergence of air power in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Black breaks new ground by exploring not only to conventional war both inside and outside Europe but also to the use of air power in unconventional wars, especially critical given to the spread of insurgencies around the globe. He vividly describes traditional debates over the pros and cons of strategic bombing and aircraft carriers versus battleships and gives equal attention to managerial, doctrinal, and technological innovations. The author shows how better management resulted in increasing lethality of close air support of the RAF during the latter part of World War II and at the same times highlights the limits of air power with case studies of the two Gulf Wars. The author goes beyond our traditional understanding of air power associated with bombing and fighter engagements, adding the important elements associated with naval power, including ground/logistics support, anti-aircraft measures, and political constraints. As he explains, air power has become Western politicians weapon of choice, spreading maximum destruction with the minimum of commitment. His current and comprehensive study considers how we got to this point, and what the future has in store. Anyone seeking a balanced, accurate understanding of air power in history will find this book an essential introduction."
Naturally each service wanted to obtain for itself some part of the air power
mission . Navy leaders were acutely aware of the limitations placed on their air
mission by the creation of the new Air Force since they looked upon the aircraft
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed ServicesPublish On: 1956
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on Armed
Services, United States Senate, Eighty-fourth Congress, Second Session. Airpower United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. IX .
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services
Author: United States. Air Force ROTC.Publish On: 1959
These factors exert their influence in a thousand ways , but a few examples will
suffice to show how they work to foster or hinder the development of national air power . The geography of Switzerland , to take an extreme case , acts as a drag
We may never again face an adversary under circumstances so congenial to air
power . We need only look back to the war in Southeast Asia to remember the limitations of airpower against a determined foe sheltered by mountains and thick
Drawing on a wealth of archival material, including critical documents unavailable to previous researchers, Clodfelter presents the most complete analysis ever of the doctrinal development underpinning current U.S. Air Force notions about ...
Author: Mark Clodfelter
Publisher: U of Nebraska Press
The Progressive Era, marked by a desire for economic, political, and social reform, ended for most Americans with the ugly reality and devastation of World War I. Yet for Army Air Service officers, the carnage and waste witnessed on the western front only served to spark a new progressive movementto reform war by relying on destructive technology as the instrument of change. InBeneficial BombingMark Clodfelter describes how American airmen, horrified by World War I's trench warfare, turned to the progressive ideas of efficiency and economy in an effort to reform war itself, with the heavy bomber as their solution to limiting the bloodshed. They were convinced that the airplane, used as a bombing platform, offered the means to make wars less lethal than conflicts waged by armies or navies. Clodfelter examines the progressive idealism that led to the creation of the U.S. Air Force and its doctrine that the finite destruction of precision bombing would end wars more quickly and with less suffering foreachbelligerent. What is more, his work shows how these progressive ideas emerged intact after World War II to become the foundation of modern U.S. Air Force doctrine. Drawing on a wealth of archival material, including critical documents unavailable to previous researchers, Clodfelter presents the most complete analysis ever of the doctrinal development underpinning current U.S. Air Force notions about strategic bombing.
Today , General Fuller remains one of the foremost proponents of Air Power in
the tactical support role which limits Air Power to the obsolete two - dimensional
pattern . He still contends that landing craft and transport aircraft should have
Operating within these limits, the U.S. Air Force helped to repel 2 invasions of South Korea while securing control of the skies so decisively that other U.N. forces could fight without fear of air attack.
Author: Wayne Thompson
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
Category: Korean War, 1950-1953
Despite American success in preventing the conquest of South Korea by communist North Korea, the Korean War of 1950-1953 did not satisfy Americans who expected the kind of total victory they had experienced in WW II. In Korea, the U.S. limited itself to conventional weapons. Even after communist China entered the war, Americans put China off-limits to conventional bombing as well as nuclear bombing. Operating within these limits, the U.S. Air Force helped to repel 2 invasions of South Korea while securing control of the skies so decisively that other U.N. forces could fight without fear of air attack.
LEFT - B - 29s take U . S . air power to Germany , heart of cold war . ABOVE -
Much of America ' s long - range bomber strength still is in cocoons . But these B -
29s are being hatched and modernized . The above Superforts , resting at figure
These essays cover a wide range of subjects and tell the story of air power's evolution over the past century.
Author: Phillip S. Meilinger
Publisher: Psychology Press
According to the author all aircrews, tacticians and those who direct them have to realise the limitations of air power during conflicts. For years opinion has differed as to whether the aircraft has altered war strategies or merely the tactics of war. This volume explores the limits of airpower.
Author: Great Britain. Air MinistryPublish On: 1918
Instructions as to the Financial Powers of Air Force Area Commanders , including
the write - off of cash , stores , supplies , etc. ( Provisional . ) Scope of Instructions
. 1. The following instructions are provisional and will apply only during the war ...
restructure the air force to take part in low - intensity conflict . " 30 The " major war
" preoccupation of air power is still retained within Soviet doctrine , even though
the concept of " reasonable sufficiency " places limits on aviation force size and ...
Author: Thomas Alexander HughesPublish On: 2010-05-11
This is the definitive story of an extraordinary man, whose remarkable efforts to aid foot soldiers in World War II contributed significantly to the Allies' success.
Author: Thomas Alexander Hughes
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
Over Lord is the fascinating story of how American tactical air power was developed by General Elwood "Pete" Quesada during World War II, including its decisive role in Operation OVERLORD and the liberation of Europe. Pete Quesada is one of World War II's unsung yet crucial heroes. With his famous "Ninth Tactical Air Command," Quesada established the best air-ground team in the European theater. he pioneered the use of radar in close air support operations, introducing weapons systems specifically geared to tactical operations. He nurtured new flying methods designed for the kind of precision bombing the battlefields of Europe demanded. And more than anything else, Pete Quesada championed efforts to model air and ground officers into a single fighting unit. His relationships with ground leaders like Generals Omar Bradley and "Lightning Joe" Collins were a model for the kind of interservice harmony that was essential for dislodging the entrenched German Army. At war's end everybody from General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower to ordinary infantrymen recognized Pete Quesada as the premier expert and dogged patron of close air support. Allied airplanes over the battlefields of Europe had undoubtedly shortened the war and saved many thousands of lives, and Pete Quesada came home to a hero's welcome in 1945. By then he was the personification of tactical air power. Indeed, he was its over lord. Unfortunately, Quesada's groundbreaking methods were all but forgotten after the war. As the Cold War deepened, Air Force leaders stressed the role of big bombers flying deep into enemy territory and renounced the importance of close air support missions. Quesada himself was shunted into jobs that were both illsuited to his fiery temperament and divorced from his wartime expertise in tactical aviation. Frustrated, he retired from the Air Force in 1951 at forty-seven years of age. Fortunately, the story of Quesada's innovative tactics did not end there for the American military. In Korea in the 1950s and Vietnam in the 1960s, U.S. servicemen struggled -- and died -- relearning and recreating the kinds of tactics that Quesada had made commonplace in 1944-45. Had the U.S. Air Force nurtured its capacity for close air support, those two conflicts may have unfolded differently. Since then, the Air Force has struggled for a better balance between its bombardment missions and its support functions. This is the definitive story of an extraordinary man, whose remarkable efforts to aid foot soldiers in World War II contributed significantly to the Allies' success. America's belated rediscovery of Quesada's precepts some forty years later in conflicts like Operation DESERT STORM only underscores the importance of Quesada's story.