Quitting Certainties

A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief

Author: Michael G. Titelbaum

Publisher: Oxford University Press

ISBN: 0199658307

Category: Mathematics

Page: 345

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Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief, called the Certainty-Loss Framework. Subjective Bayesianism is epistemologists' standard theory of how individuals should change their degrees of belief over time. But despite the theory's power, it is widely recognized to fail for situations agents face every day. Michael G. Titelbaum argues that these failures stem from a common source: the inability ofConditionalization (Bayesianism's traditional updating rule) to model claims' going from certainty at an earlier time to less-than-certainty later on. He presents the first systematic, comprehensive Bayesianframework to accurately represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss. Titelbaum compares the framework he proposes to alternatives, then applies it to cases in epistemology, decision theory, the theory of identity, and the philosophy of quantum mechanics. This is the first unified Bayesian framework capable of accurately modeling rational requirements in cases involving memory loss and context-sensitivity. It has applications to suchdiverse topics as indifference principles, relations among epistemic peers, Everettian interpretations of quantum mechanics, the Fine-Tuning Argument for the multiverse, and the controversial SleepingBeauty problem. Titelbaum develops his ambitious project with rigor and philosophical subtlety: the book makes a major contribution to the literature on formal epistemology.
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Bayesian Philosophy of Science

Author: Jan Sprenger,Stephan Hartmann

Publisher: N.A

ISBN: 0199672113

Category: Bayesian statistical decision theory

Page: 384

View: 6248

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How should we reason in science? Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann offer a refreshing take on classical topics in philosophy of science, using a single key concept to explain and to elucidate manifold aspects of scientific reasoning. They present good arguments and good inferences as beingcharacterized by their effect on our rational degrees of belief. Refuting the view that there is no place for subjective attitudes in "objective science", Sprenger and Hartmann explain the value of convincing evidence in terms of a cycle of variations on the theme of representing rational degrees ofbelief by means of subjective probabilities (and changing them by Bayesian conditionalization). In doing so, they integrate Bayesian inference - the leading theory of rationality in social science - with the practice of 21st century science.Bayesian Philosophy of Science thereby shows how modeling such attitudes improves our understanding of causes, explanations, confirming evidence, and scientific models in general. It combines a scientifically minded and mathematically sophisticated approach with conceptual analysis and attention tomethodological problems of modern science, especially in statistical inference, and is therefore a valuable resource for philosophers and scientific practitioners.
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Reasons without Persons

Rationality, Identity, and Time

Author: Brian Hedden

Publisher: OUP Oxford

ISBN: 0191046574

Category: Philosophy

Page: 240

View: 2161

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Brian Hedden defends a radical view about the relationship between rationality, personal identity, and time. On the standard view, personal identity over time plays a central role in thinking about rationality. This is because, on the standard view, there are rational norms for how a person's attitudes and actions at one time should fit with her attitudes and actions at other times, norms that apply within a person but not across persons. But these norms are problematic. They make what you rationally ought to believe or do depend on facts about your past that aren't part of your current perspective on the world, and they make rationality depend on controversial, murky metaphysical facts about what binds different instantaneous snapshots (or 'time-slices') into a single person extended in time. Hedden takes a different approach, treating the relationship between different time-slices of the same person as no different from the relationship between different people. For purposes of rational evaluation, a temporally extended person is akin to a group of people. The locus of rationality is the time-slice rather than the temporally extended agent. Taking an impersonal, time-slice-centric approach to rationality yields a unified approach to the rationality of beliefs, preferences, and actions where what rationality demands of you is solely determined by your evidence, with no special weight given to your past beliefs or actions.
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Proceedings

The ... Southeastern Symposium on System Theory

Author: N.A

Publisher: N.A

ISBN: 9780818608476

Category: System theory

Page: 699

View: 4450

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System Theory

20th Annual Southeastern Symposium : Papers

Author: N.A

Publisher: N.A

ISBN: 9780818608476

Category:

Page: N.A

View: 5722

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