This book presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief, called the Certainty-Loss Framework.
Author: Michael G. Titelbaum
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief, called the Certainty-Loss Framework. Subjective Bayesianism is epistemologists' standard theory of how individuals should change their degrees of belief over time. But despite the theory's power, it is widely recognized to fail for situations agents face every day. Michael G. Titelbaum argues that these failures stem from a common source: the inability ofConditionalization (Bayesianism's traditional updating rule) to model claims' going from certainty at an earlier time to less-than-certainty later on. He presents the first systematic, comprehensive Bayesianframework to accurately represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss. Titelbaum compares the framework he proposes to alternatives, then applies it to cases in epistemology, decision theory, the theory of identity, and the philosophy of quantum mechanics. This is the first unified Bayesian framework capable of accurately modeling rational requirements in cases involving memory loss and context-sensitivity. It has applications to suchdiverse topics as indifference principles, relations among epistemic peers, Everettian interpretations of quantum mechanics, the Fine-Tuning Argument for the multiverse, and the controversial SleepingBeauty problem. Titelbaum develops his ambitious project with rigor and philosophical subtlety: the book makes a major contribution to the literature on formal epistemology.
MetaAnalysis of Free Response Studies 1992–2008: Assessing the Noise
Reduction Model in Parapsychology. Psychological Bulletin 136 ... Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. Oxford: Oxford
Author: Jan Sprenger
Category: Bayesian statistical decision theory
How should we reason in science? Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann offer a refreshing take on classical topics in philosophy of science, using a single key concept to explain and to elucidate manifold aspects of scientific reasoning. They present good arguments and good inferences as beingcharacterized by their effect on our rational degrees of belief. Refuting the view that there is no place for subjective attitudes in "objective science", Sprenger and Hartmann explain the value of convincing evidence in terms of a cycle of variations on the theme of representing rational degrees ofbelief by means of subjective probabilities (and changing them by Bayesian conditionalization). In doing so, they integrate Bayesian inference - the leading theory of rationality in social science - with the practice of 21st century science.Bayesian Philosophy of Science thereby shows how modeling such attitudes improves our understanding of causes, explanations, confirming evidence, and scientific models in general. It combines a scientifically minded and mathematically sophisticated approach with conceptual analysis and attention tomethodological problems of modern science, especially in statistical inference, and is therefore a valuable resource for philosophers and scientific practitioners.
Thurstone, L. L. 1927. A Law of Comparative Judgment. Psychological Review,
34, 266–270. Titelbaum, M. G. 2012. Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tversky, A. 1972.
Author: Simon M. Huttegger
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
This book extends Bayesian epistemology to develop new approaches to general rational learning within the framework of probability theory.
Titelbaum, Michael. 2010. “Tell Me You Love Me: Bootstrapping, Externalism,
and No-Lose Epistemology.” Philosophical Studies 149:119–34. Titelbaum,
Michael. 2013. Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief ...
Author: Brian Hedden
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Brian Hedden defends a radical view about the relationship between rationality, personal identity, and time. On the standard view, personal identity over time plays a central role in thinking about rationality. This is because, on the standard view, there are rational norms for how a person's attitudes and actions at one time should fit with her attitudes and actions at other times, norms that apply within a person but not across persons. But these norms are problematic. They make what you rationally ought to believe or do depend on facts about your past that aren't part of your current perspective on the world, and they make rationality depend on controversial, murky metaphysical facts about what binds different instantaneous snapshots (or 'time-slices') into a single person extended in time. Hedden takes a different approach, treating the relationship between different time-slices of the same person as no different from the relationship between different people. For purposes of rational evaluation, a temporally extended person is akin to a group of people. The locus of rationality is the time-slice rather than the temporally extended agent. Taking an impersonal, time-slice-centric approach to rationality yields a unified approach to the rationality of beliefs, preferences, and actions where what rationality demands of you is solely determined by your evidence, with no special weight given to your past beliefs or actions.
A Doxastic Modeling Framework Michael Gaard Titelbaum ... a kind of situation
that is supposed to be a problem for Bayesian frameworks : situations in which
the set of claims to which an agent assigns degrees of belief changes over time .
Recently a new field of modelling has opened with the dynamic analysis of traffic
and its structure. ... For this purpose, the Bayesian framework (Vardi, 1996) and
neural networks (Doulamis, Doulamis, & Kollias, 2003) have been proposed. ...
There can never be certainty, but as evidence accumulates, the degree of belief
in a hypothesis changes. ... several end to end traffic users entering the network
into one edge router (the origin) and exiting at an other edge router (the
Author: Freire, Mario
Publisher: IGI Global
Provides the most thorough examination of Internet technologies and applications for researchers in a variety of related fields. For the average Internet consumer, as well as for experts in the field of networking and Internet technologies.
A stopping rule and clustering method of wide applicability . Botany Gazette 1984
... Minsky M . A framework for representing knowledge . In : Winston P , ed . ...
Duda RO , Hart PE , Nilsson NJ : Subjective Bayesian methods for rulebased
inference systems . Proc AFIPS Nat ... Fuzzy mathematical models in engineering
and management science . Amsterdam ... data to arrive at a fixed set of solutions
with certainty . ... A scheme for assigning a degree of belief to a fact or rule .
Author: Kenneth D. Bauer
Aimed at pathologists, oncologists, haematologists and laboratory medicine specialists, this book on flow cytometry addresses such topics as fundamental principles, basic techniques and clinical applications, with an emphasis on its relation to the biology of human cancers and other diseases. Chapters on the clinical application of flow cytometry include its use in diagnosing lymphomas and a wide variety of other cancers. Each organ-system chapter is followed by a clinical commentary that provides additional perspectives on the diagnosis utility of this technology.
Issues from the range of human affairs test the student' s framework for ethical
judgment. ... Optimal stopping. ... Team decisions and stochastic programs;
quadratic costs and certainty equivalents. ... Topics : how to organize the decision
conversation, the role of the decision analysis cycle and the model sequence, ...
Object is to prepare doctoral students for research and to enable all to
understand the discipline at the most fundamental levels. ... Belief propagation