In a comprehensive cross-national study of all non-democratic states from 1946 to 2002 that examines the political uses of these institutions by dictators, Gandhi finds that legislative and partisan institutions are an important component ...
Author: Jennifer Gandhi
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Category: Political Science
Often dismissed as window-dressing, nominally democratic institutions, such as legislatures and political parties, play an important role in non-democratic regimes. In a comprehensive cross-national study of all non-democratic states from 1946 to 2002 that examines the political uses of these institutions by dictators, Gandhi finds that legislative and partisan institutions are an important component in the operation and survival of authoritarian regimes. She examines how and why these institutions are useful to dictatorships in maintaining power, analyzing the way dictators utilize institutions as a forum in which to organize political concessions to potential opposition in an effort to neutralize threats to their power and to solicit cooperation from groups outside of the ruling elite. The use of legislatures and parties to co-opt opposition results in significant institutional effects on policies and outcomes under dictatorship.
Countering Coups : Leadership Succession Rules in Dictatorships , Comparative
Political Studies 50 ( 7 ) : 935 - 62 . Gandhi , J . ( 2008 ) . Political Institutions under Dictatorship . New York : Cambridge University Press . Gandhi , J . and ...
Author: Rudy B. Andeweg
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Category: Political Science
Political executives have been at the centre of public and scholarly attention long before the inception of modern political science. In the contemporary world, political executives have come to dominate the political stage in many democratic and autocratic regimes. The Oxford Handbook of Political Executives marks the definitive reference work in this field. Edited and written by a team of word-class scholars, it combines substantive stocktaking with setting new agendas for the next generation of political executive research.
2001. “Political Turnover and Social Change in Senegal.” Journal of Democracy
12 (3): 51–62. Gamson, William A. 1992. Talking Politics. New York: Cambridge
University Press. Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. Political Institutions under Dictatorship.
Author: Stephan Haggard
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Category: Political Science
From the 1980s through the first decade of the twenty-first century, the spread of democracy across the developing and post-Communist worlds transformed the global political landscape. What drove these changes and what determined whether the emerging democracies would stabilize or revert to authoritarian rule? Dictators and Democrats takes a comprehensive look at the transitions to and from democracy in recent decades. Deploying both statistical and qualitative analysis, Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman engage with theories of democratic change and advocate approaches that emphasize political and institutional factors. While inequality has been a prominent explanation for democratic transitions, the authors argue that its role has been limited, and elites as well as masses can drive regime change. Examining seventy-eight cases of democratic transition and twenty-five reversions since 1980, Haggard and Kaufman show how differences in authoritarian regimes and organizational capabilities shape popular protest and elite initiatives in transitions to democracy, and how institutional weaknesses cause some democracies to fail. The determinants of democracy lie in the strength of existing institutions and the public's capacity to engage in collective action. There are multiple routes to democracy, but those growing out of mass mobilization may provide more checks on incumbents than those emerging from intra-elite bargains. Moving beyond well-known beliefs regarding regime changes, Dictators and Democrats explores the conditions under which transitions to democracy are likely to arise.
Author: Assistant Professor of Political Science Xian HuangPublish On: 2020-08-31
Health Politics and Policy in China Assistant Professor of Political Science Xian
Huang, Xian Huang. Flora ... 2010 Socialist Insecurity: Pensions and the Politics
of Uneven Development in China. ... Political Institutions under Dictatorship.
Author: Assistant Professor of Political Science Xian Huang
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Category: Health & Fitness
"Why would authoritarian leaders expand social welfare provision in the absence of democratization? What are the distributive features and implications of social welfare expansion in an authoritarian country? How do authoritarian leaders design and enforce social welfare expansion in a decentralized multilevel governance setting? This book identifies the trade-off authoritarian leaders face in social welfare provision: effectively balancing between elites and masses in order to maximize the regime's survival prospects. Using government documents, filed interviews, survey data, and government statistics about Chinese social health insurance, this book reveals that the Chinese authoritarian leaders attempt to manage the distributive trade-off by a "stratified expansion" strategy, establishing an expansive yet stratified social health insurance system to perpetuate a particularly privileged program for the elites while developing an essentially modest health provision for the masses. In China's decentralized multilevel governance setting, the stratified expansion of social health insurance is implemented by local leaders who confront various fiscal and social constraints in vastly different local circumstances. As a result, there is great regional variation in the expansion of social health insurance, in addition to the benefit stratification across social strata. The dynamics of central-local interaction in enforcing the stratified expansion of social health insurance stands at the core of the politics of health reform in China during the first decade of the 2000s. This book demonstrates that the strategic balance between elites and masses in benefit distribution is delicate in authoritarian and decentralized multilevel governance settings"--
Political Institutions under Dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2014. “Authoritarian Elections and Regime Change.” In Comparing
Democracies: Elections and Voting in a Changing World, edited by Lawrence
Author: Zhongyuan Wang
Publisher: Lexington Books
Category: Political Science
This book explores why, how, and under what conditions a single-party regime uses formal democratic institutions to strengthen its rule. Zhongyuan Wang challenges the traditional perceptions that the Chinese congress acts either as mere window dressing or as an immediate catalyst for democratization. He argues that managed elections and mobilized representation are two strategic cards of China’s one-party regime. By downplaying input electoral competition but promoting output congressional representation, the Chinese Communist Party has been committed to remodeling its unique brand of “socialist democracy” as an alternative to liberal democracy. Such a model of democracy with Chinese characteristics features the “Leninist trinity” of the Party’s leadership, the rule of law, and people’s sovereignty, as well as a new form of mobilized representation that relies heavily on non-electoral accountability from the top down. Remodeling democracy enables China’s one-party regime to enhance its resilience and consolidate and sustain its rule.
Political Institutions Under Dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Geddes, Barbara. 1999. “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty
Years?” American Political Science Review 2: 115–144. Haber, Stephen, and ...
Author: Roger D. Congleton
Publisher: Oxford Handbooks
Category: Business & Economics
"This two-volume collection provides a comprehensive overview of the past seventy years of public choice research, written by experts in the fields surveyed. The individual chapters are more than simple surveys, but provide readers with both a sense of the progress made and puzzles that remain. Most are written with upper level undergraduate and graduate students in economics and political science in mind, but many are completely accessible to non-expert readers who are interested in Public Choice research. The two-volume set will be of broad interest to social scientists, policy analysts, and historians"--
In its fourth function , the party coordinates the different township political institutions such as the Public Office , Assembly , Farmers ' Association , schools
and police . The Township Party Office accomplishes this through a number of
Variations to suit the very divergent environmental conditions prevalent in areas under dictatorial rule have given birth to at least two major forms — both of which
have been adapted with deviations - plus a number of other fairly unique and ...
... armies , a dictatorship , and a heavy taxation , might eventually compromise
the fate of the republican institutions . But we ... It is a conciliatory government under which resolutions are allowed time to ripen ; and in which they are
system in such way as to make a popular statesman into a dictator . When , as in
the United States , republican institutions , instead of being slowly evolved , are
all at once created , there grows up within them an agency of wirepulling ...
systein in such way as to make a popular statesman into a dictator . ... having
before been controlled are made controllers , they presently fall under the rule of
an organized body that chooses their candidates and arranges for them a political ...
8 . of a dictator curtailed the rights of the individual citizen . He was in a way also
a representative of the conservative party . It is not strange , therefore , that the
party of progress fiercely attacked the institution , and as that party grew Liv . 27 .
Author: Econometric Society. World CongressPublish On: 2006-08-14
5 INEFFICIENT POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS The above analysis characterized the
equilibrium under “ the dictatorship of the elite , " a set of political institutions that
gave all political power to the elite producers . An alternative is to have “ the ...
The concepts ' elective dictatorship ' and ' democratic centralism ' share the same
view of the power structure within British political institutions : the identical
analysis then leads to diametrically opposed conclusions . How far will the
Author: Lynton J. Robins
Publisher: London ; New York : Longman ; London : Politics Association
In a democracy power is constantly redistributed whereas in a dictatorship it is
more and more concentrated . b . Power tends to become concentrated and to
perpetuate itself in the hands of the political institutions in a dictatorship . C .
Power is ...
Another AP argues that : We are under a political democracy and under an
economic dictatorship ; the government does whatever it pleases . For example ,
it promises a good price for wheat and everybody plants a lot of wheat . Then at ...
The rigidity of political institutions found in a dictatorship is repudiated by a
democracy , for the essence of democracy is peaceful change . In a democracy
the importance attributed to the individual and to individual and group interests
Economic and political disturbances in the wake of World War I led to the
emergence of the Fascist dictatorship in Italy . ... ( except , of course , for East
Germany , which , being under Soviet control , was recast as a Communist dictatorship ) .
Martial law and dictatorship actually abetted the growth of both insurgencies . ...
Because all the political institutions under the old constitution ( except the
presidency ) were destroyed or put in suspended animation , the military was
made to ...
It was inevitable since it supposedly justified Spain ' s peculiar dictatorial
institutions . ... remained key , and its role in the planning of that strategy
remained subordinate because of the dictatorial nature of its political institutions under Franco .