Accounting Ethics: Theories of accounting ethics and their dissemination

Author: J. Edward Ketz

Publisher: Taylor & Francis

ISBN: 9780415350808

Category: Accountants

Page: 440

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The ruination of investors in Enron, WorldCom, Waste Management, Aldelphia, Tyco and scores of other business concerns has raised questions about the adequacy and relevance of academic research into accounting ethics, as well as the ethical nature of professional parties. This research collection includes important papers from key journals and books that reassess theories, research studies, and professional practices in the field of accounting ethics. In addition to examining the current crisis in the creditability of financial reports, many of the papers here work toward developing a body of knowledge that will protect the investing public in the future.
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Using Surveys to Value Public Goods

The Contingent Valuation Method

Author: Robert Cameron Mitchell,Richard T. Carson

Publisher: Routledge

ISBN: 1135887810

Category: Technology & Engineering

Page: 484

View: 2742

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Economists and others have long believed that by balancing the costs of such public goods as air quality and wilderness areas against their benefits, informed policy choices can be made. But the problem of putting a dollar value on cleaner air or water and other goods not sold in the marketplace has been a major stumbling block. Mitchell and Carson, for reasons presented in this book, argue that at this time the contingent valuation (CV) method offers the most promising approach for determining public willingness to pay for many public goods---an approach likely to succeed, if used carefully, where other methods may fail. The result of ten years of research by the authors aimed at assessing how surveys might best be used to value public goods validly and reliably, this book makes a major contribution to what constitutes best practice in CV surveys. Mitchell and Carson begin by introducing the contingent valuation method, describing how it works and the nature of the benefits it can be used to measure, comparing it to other methods for measuring benefits, and examining the data-gathering technique on which it is based---survey research. Placing contingent valuation in the larger context of welfare theory, the authors examine how the CV method impels a deeper understanding of willingness-to-pay versus willingness-to-accept compensation measures, the possibility of existence values for public goods, the role of uncertainty in benefit valuation, and the question of whether a consumer goods market or a political goods market (referenda) should be emulated. In developing a CV methodology, the authors deal with issues of broader significance to survey research. Their model of respondent error is relevant to current efforts to frame a theory of response behavior and bias typology will interest those considering the cognitive aspects of answering survey questions. Mitchell and Carson conclude that the contingent valuation method can obtain valid valuation information on public goods, but only if the method is applied in a way that addresses the potential sources of error and bias. They end their book by providing guidelines for CV practitioners, a list of questions that should be asked by any decision maker who wishes to use the findings of a CV study, and suggestions for new applications of contingent valuation. Additional features include a comprehensive bibliography of the CV literature and an appendix summarizing more than 100 CV studies.
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Game Theory and the Social Contract: Just playing

Author: K. G. Binmore,Emeritus Professor of Economics Ken Binmore

Publisher: MIT Press

ISBN: 9780262024440

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 589

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In this second volume the author unveils his own controversial theory, which abandons the metaphysics of Immanuel Kant for the naturalistic approach to mortality of David Hume. According to this viewpoint, a fairness norm is a convention that evolved to co-ordinate behaviour on an equalibrium of a society's Game of Life. This approach allows the author to mount an evolutionary defence of Rawls' original position that escapes the utilitarian conclusions that follow when orthodox reasoning is applied with the traditional assumptions. Using ideas borrowed from the theory of bargaining and repeat games, the author is led instead to a form of egalitarianism that vindicates the intuitions that led Rawls to write his "Theory of Justice". Written for an interdisciplinary audience, the book aims to offer a panoramic tour through a range of insights that game theory brings to anthropology, biology, economics, philosophy and psychology.
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Game Theory and its Applications

In the Social and Biological Sciences

Author: Andrew M. Colman

Publisher: Psychology Press

ISBN: 1134987560

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 392

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Andrew Coleman provides an accessible introduction to the fundamentals of mathematical gaming and other major applications in social psychology, decision theory, economics, politics, evolutionary biology, philosophy, operational research and sociology.
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Papers in Game Theory

Author: J.C. Harsanyi

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

ISBN: 9401725276

Category: Philosophy

Page: 260

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This volume contains twelve of my game-theoretical papers, published in the period of 1956-80. It complements my Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation, Reidel, 1976, and my Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations, Cambridge University Press, 1977. These twelve papers deal with a wide range of game-theoretical problems. But there is a common intellectual thread going though all of them: they are all parts of an attempt to generalize and combine various game-theoretical solution concepts into a unified solution theory yielding one-point solutions for both cooperative and noncooperative games, and covering even such 'non-classical' games as games with incomplete information. SECTION A The first three papers deal with bargaining models. The first one discusses Nash's two-person bargaining solution and shows its equivalence with Zeuthen's bargaining theory. The second considers the rationality postulates underlying the Nash-Zeuthen theory and defends it against Schelling's objections. The third extends the Shapley value to games without transferable utility and proposes a solution concept that is at the same time a generaliza tion of the Shapley value and of the Nash bargaining solution.
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Two-Sided Matching

A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis

Author: Alvin E. Roth,Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

ISBN: 1107782430

Category: Business & Economics

Page: N.A

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Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann
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Essentials of Game Theory

A Concise, Multidisciplinary Introduction

Author: Kevin Leyton-Brown,Yoav Shoham

Publisher: Morgan & Claypool Publishers

ISBN: 1598295934

Category: Computers

Page: 88

View: 3419

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Game theory is the mathematical study of interaction among independent, self-interested agents. The audience for game theory has grown dramatically in recent years, and now spans disciplines as diverse as political science, biology, psychology, economics, linguistics, sociology, and computer science, among others. What has been missing is a relatively short introduction to the field covering the common basis that anyone with a professional interest in game theory is likely to require. Such a text would minimize notation, ruthlessly focus on essentials, and yet not sacrifice rigor. This Synthesis Lecture aims to fill this gap by providing a concise and accessible introduction to the field. It covers the main classes of games, their representations, and the main concepts used to analyze them. Table of Contents: Games in Normal Form / Analyzing Games: From Optimality to Equilibrium / Further Solution Concepts for Normal-Form Games / Games with Sequential Actions: The Perfect-information Extensive Form / Generalizing the Extensive Form: Imperfect-Information Games / Repeated and Stochastic Games / Uncertainty about Payoffs: Bayesian Games / Coalitional Game Theory / History and References / Index
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