The Quadrennial Defense Review may lead to an increased emphasis in future U.S. defense budgets on conducting irregular warfare (IW) operations, such as counterinsurgency operations.

Author: Ronald O'Rourke

Publisher: DIANE Publishing

ISBN: 9781437918731

Category:

Page: 10

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The Quadrennial Defense Review may lead to an increased emphasis in future U.S. defense budgets on conducting irregular warfare (IW) operations, such as counterinsurgency operations. In addition, counter-terrorism (CT) operations have received an increased emphasis since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of IW and CT activities, and has taken steps in recent years to strengthen its ability to conduct such activities. Contents of this report: (1) Intro.; (2) Background: Long-standing Navy Activities; Initiatives Since 2005; Current Operations; FY 2010 Funding Request; Navy Irregular Warfare Office; Navy Expeditionary Combat Command; Riverine Force; Global Fleet Stations; (3) Oversight Issues for Congress.

Issues and Lessons Learned : Hearing Before the Before the Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress,
First Session ...

Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities

Publisher:

ISBN: MINN:31951D031105745

Category: Asymmetric warfare

Page: 62

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In addition to these threats , there are a range of challenges that may impact the
future of U.S. irregular warfare efforts . ... As John Nagl concluded in his study of
counterinsurgency warfare , referring to the post - Vietnam era : " Rather than ...

Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

Publisher:

ISBN: MINN:31951D03526167Q

Category: Counterinsurgency

Page: 98

View: 691

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Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars , ” International Security
20 : 4 ( Spring 1996 ) , 136 – 75 . Kilcullen , David J . “ Three Pillars of
Counterinsurgency , ” paper delivered at the U . S . Government
Counterinsurgency ...

Author:

Publisher:

ISBN: UOM:39015075667066

Category: Counterinsurgency

Page: 343

View: 364

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Product Description: Since the tragic events of 9/11 and the consequent advent of the Global War on Terrorism, there has been a remarkable surge of interest in counterinsurgency. This anthology presents 27 articles on counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, particularly highlighting and examining the U.S. Marine Corps' roles in conflicts from 1898 through 2007. It also includes an extensive bibliography of works on these conflicts. Continuing discussion and study of these subjects is of critical importance to the ongoing efforts of the United States and its allies in the Global War on Terrorism. The anthology is divided broadly into two halves: the first half presents historical examples of counterinsurgency involving the United States-from the Philippines and the "Banana Wars" up through Vietnam-while the second half addresses the nation's contemporary efforts in this regard. Articles cover the situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. The selected bibliography addresses a broad range of subjects: on higher-end operational/strategic level of war considerations, on geopolitical context, and on a varied array of related topics-political theory, historical case studies, failed states, cultural studies and analysis, and many others-that all provide context or play a role in conducting a counterinsurgency and achieving success in the realm of irregular warfare. Colonel Stephen S. Evans, USMCR, researched and compiled this work as a field historian with the Marine Corps History Division. He has experience at various operational levels, both joint and multinational, in CONUS and overseas, and has performed duty with all three MEFs, MARFORLANT, MARFOREUR, and U.S. forces in Korea. He has also held a range of positions in administrative and educational roles at Quantico and the Pentagon. Colonel Evans holds a doctorate in history from Temple University and has published two historical monographs.

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare . Oxford ; New York : Osprey , 2008 , http :
//www.worldcat.org/oclc/166380048 . Insurgency has been a prominent form of
warfare throughout history . Likewise , regular armies have often struggled to ...

Author: Summer Newton

Publisher:

ISBN: MINN:31951D03647368S

Category: Counterinsurgency

Page: 131

View: 755

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PUNCTURING THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MYTH : BRITAIN AND
IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE PAST , PRESENT , AND FUTURE
INTRODUCTION Britain's irregular warfare experience in the postWorld War II
era presented the military ...

Author: Andrew Mumford

Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College

ISBN: UOM:39015088037752

Category: Counterinsurgency

Page: 26

View: 646

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This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force.

focused on the irregular warfare missions of counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism, among them the US Army and US Marine Corps's Field Manual
3-24, titled Counterinsurgency, and the DOD's National Military Strategic Plan for
the War on ...

Author: Richard H. Shultz Jr.

Publisher: Georgetown University Press

ISBN: 9781626167650

Category: Political Science

Page: 312

View: 957

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When Joint Special Operations Command deployed Task Force 714 to Iraq in 2003, it faced an adversary unlike any it had previously encountered: al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI’s organization into multiple, independent networks and its application of Information Age technologies allowed it to wage war across a vast landscape. To meet this unique threat, TF 714 developed the intelligence capacity to operate inside those networks, and in the words of commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal, USA (Ret.) “claw the guts out of AQI.” In Transforming US Intelligence for Irregular War, Richard H. Shultz Jr. provides a broad discussion of the role of intelligence in combatting nonstate militants and revisits this moment of innovation during the Iraq War, showing how the defense and intelligence communities can adapt to new and evolving foes. Shultz tells the story of how TF 714 partnered with US intelligence agencies to dismantle AQI’s secret networks by eliminating many of its key leaders. He also reveals how TF 714 altered its methods and practices of intelligence collection, intelligence analysis, and covert paramilitary operations to suppress AQI’s growing insurgency and, ultimately, destroy its networked infrastructure. TF 714 remains an exemplar of successful organizational learning and adaptation in the midst of modern warfare. By examining its innovations, Shultz makes a compelling case for intelligence leading the way in future campaigns against nonstate armed groups.

This book explores the ways in which democracies can win counterinsurgencies when they implement a proper strategy.

Author: William Patterson

Publisher: Springer

ISBN: 9781137600608

Category: Political Science

Page: 170

View: 136

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This book explores the ways in which democracies can win counterinsurgencies when they implement a proper strategy. At a time when the USA is retrenching from two bungled foreign wars that involved deadly insurgent uprisings, this is a particularly important argument. Succumbing to the trauma of those engagements and drawing the wrong conclusions about counterinsurgency can only lead to further defeat in the future. Rather than assuming that counterinsurgency is ineffective, it is crucial to understand that a conventional response to an insurgent challenge is likely to fail. Counterinsurgency must be applied from the beginning, and if done properly can be highly effective, even when used by democratic regimes. In fact, because such regimes are often wealthier; have more experience at institution-building and functional governance; are more pluralistic in nature and therefore enjoy higher levels of legitimacy than do autocracies, democracies may have considerable advantages in counterinsurgency warfare. Rather than give up in despair, democracies should learn to leverage these advantages and implement them against future insurgencies.

This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare.

Author: Andrew Mumford

Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College

ISBN: UOM:39015088037752

Category: Counterinsurgency

Page: 26

View: 617

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This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force.

Placing the war against al Qaeda and its allied groups and organizations in the context of a global insurgency, Cassidy presents implications for doctrine, interagency coordination, and military cultural change.

Author: Robert M. Cassidy (Ph.D.)

Publisher: Greenwood Publishing Group

ISBN: 0275989909

Category: History

Page: 211

View: 747

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Placing the war against al Qaeda and its allied groups and organizations in the context of a global insurgency, Cassidy presents implications for doctrine, interagency coordination, and military cultural change.

... top military leaders from George Washington onward have demonstrated
varying degrees of antipathy toward preparations for irregular warfare, generally
viewing it as an uncivilized and irrelevant anomaly. Dabbling in
counterinsurgency is ...

Author: David H. Ucko

Publisher: Georgetown University Press

ISBN: 9781589017283

Category: Political Science

Page: 272

View: 880

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Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to “re-learn” counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned anything from past failures? In The New Counterinsurgency Era, David Ucko examines DoD’s institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance—all while stabilizing conquered territory and engaging with local populations. After briefly surveying the history of American counterinsurgency operations, Ucko focuses on measures the military has taken since 2001 to relearn old lessons about counterinsurgency, to improve its ability to conduct stability operations, to change the institutional bias against counterinsurgency, and to account for successes gained from the learning process. Given the effectiveness of insurgent tactics, the frequency of operations aimed at building local capacity, and the danger of ungoverned spaces acting as havens for hostile groups, the military must acquire new skills to confront irregular threats in future wars. Ucko clearly shows that the opportunity to come to grips with counterinsurgency is matched in magnitude only by the cost of failing to do so.

should not be held responsible for the entire counterinsurgency posture . Yet with
legitimate concern for the accuracy with which it had been interpreting its own
role in the areas of unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency and in an
effort ...

Author: Richard H. Shultz

Publisher: Free Press

ISBN: UOM:39015016918602

Category: Political Science

Page: 433

View: 458

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The rules of engagement in the third world are as structured as a ballet. This volume examines how US and Soviet foreign policies address Guerrilla warfare in the third world and gives a broad strategic analysis of low-intensity conflict objectives and constraints. Twenty-eight contributions. No index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Internal War , The New Communist Tactic , " Military Review , 42 : 11-22 , April
1962 . ... Cuba : A Case Study of a Successful Attempt to Seize Political Power by
the Application of Unconventional Warfare , ” Annals of the American Academy of
 ...

Author: John S. Pustay

Publisher: New York : Free Press

ISBN: UOM:39015002207614

Category: Developing countries

Page: 236

View: 515

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This book examines the long, complex experience of American involvement in irregular warfare.

Author: Russell Crandall

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

ISBN: 9781107003132

Category: History

Page: 598

View: 842

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This book examines the long, complex experience of American involvement in irregular warfare. It begins with the American Revolution in 1776 and chronicles big and small irregular wars for the next two and a half centuries. What is readily apparent in dirty wars is that failure is painfully tangible while success is often amorphous. Successfully fighting these wars often entails striking a critical balance between military victory and politics. America's status as a democracy only serves to make fighting - and, to a greater degree, winning - these irregular wars even harder. Rather than futilely insisting that Americans should not or cannot fight this kind of irregular war, Russell Crandall argues that we would be better served by considering how we can do so as cleanly and effectively as possible.

... Edward O'Connell , Brooke Stearns Lawson , and Robert E. Hunter , War by
Other Means : Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for
Counterinsurgency : RAND Counterinsurgency Study — Final Report , Santa
Monica , Calif .

Author: Richard Mesic

Publisher: Rand Corporation

ISBN: NWU:35556039779749

Category: History

Page: 90

View: 944

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"The U.S. Air Force leadership plans in the near term to identify and implement a range of initiatives for enhancing the service's contributions to irregular warfare (IW) operations and to meet DoD guidance that directs its components to "recognize that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare." This monograph is the result of a "quick-turn" study to provide the leadership with a menu of actions it could consider both in the very near term and over an extended period to strengthen and expand the Air Force's capabilities to take part in joint and interagency efforts in irregular warfare. Rather than developing detailed endpoints for Air Force capabilities or structure in the future--e.g., what the USAF could look like in, say, 2015--the authors propose solution vectors that could enable the Air Force to move out quickly while continuing to consider responses to emerging demands in a dynamic IW environment."--Rand web site.

Special operations apparently has replaced special air warfare, the latter being
an Air Force term referring to the air aspects of counterinsurgency,
unconventional warfare, and psychological operations. This change has two
effects: it gives all ...

Author: David J. Dean

Publisher: U.S. Government Printing Office

ISBN: UCR:31210023609249

Category: Aeronautics, Military

Page: 127

View: 723

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Colonel Dean examines the increasing importance of third world countries in global affairs. Their vital natural resources and geostrategic locations make them the object of intense competition between the superpowers and a ripe target for a new category of conflict. Because of the high probability of US involvement in third world conflicts, we must adapt our resources to acquire the flexibility demanded by low-intensity conflict.

Most troubling is the author's misleading use of basic terms like unconventional
warfare, or UW, and counterinsurgency. The original mission of the 10th Special
Forces Group in 1952 was to infiltrate behind enemy lines to conduct UW, that is,
 ...

Author:

Publisher:

ISBN: MSU:31293025838495

Category: Military art and science

Page:

View: 590

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... capable of successfully executing counterinsurgency operations and other
forms of irregular warfare.8 The need to do so provides one of the most important
reasons for the Services to emphasize cultural awareness and language training.

Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee

Publisher:

ISBN: PSU:000066767060

Category: Education

Page: 148

View: 275

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Author: American University (Washington, D.C.). Special Operations Research Office

Publisher:

ISBN: UVA:X000450292

Category: Guerrilla warfare

Page: 123

View: 666

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Gender, Resistance, and Counterinsurgency During the Philippine-American
War, 1898-1902 Dawn Anne Ottevaere ... Army has prepared for conventional
war , although its actual mission more often involved irregular warfare , defined
as the ...

Author: Dawn Anne Ottevaere

Publisher:

ISBN: MSU:31293030635902

Category: Counterinsurgency

Page: 582

View: 348

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During the Philippine-American War, the U.S. Army innovated gendered tactics to suppress native resistance, making control of female populations essential to military operations. I argue in this dissertation that Progressive Era American ideas of masculinity and femininity influenced counterinsurgency development from 1898 to 1902, shaping resistance and violence in the Philippines while setting the future course of U.S. military doctrine. An analysis of civilian resistance and U.S. counterinsurgency reveals key tactical drivers, including native female mobility, kinship networks, wage work, reproductive labor, portable wealth, and access to legal systems. Despite female support for local Filipino guerrillas, American soldiers' attention to these drivers often stabilized villages, enhanced intelligence collection platforms, targeted high value individuals, and provided access to civilian infrastructure. However, this approach also placed the minds, bodies, and labor of women at the center of a violent struggle, providing additional challenges for security operations. U.S. strategic leaders acknowledged clear indicators of indigenous female participation in the war, but could not reconcile gender issues into an overarching military policy. Ultimately, the ad hoc U.S. counterinsurgency was unsuccessful in establishing long term stability in the Philippines.